In  2017 there were 400,000 foreign-born residents in Portugal and the far right was virtually non-existent. Eight years later, it’s home to 1.6 million foreigners (15% of the total population), and the far right has become the second-largest force in parliament. Across Europe, the correlation between rising migration and the growth of xenophobic parties appears almost inevitable (1). ‘The French people don’t want any more immigration,’ is Marine Le Pen’s conclusion. She wants a referendum. But what’s the right question?

Let’s return to Portugal in 2008, well before the recent migration boom. The country, hit by the financial crisis, was on the brink of bankruptcy. In exchange for aid, the International Monetary Fund and EU demanded reforms: Lisbon was to ‘modernise’ its economy – in other words, privatise, slash public spending and deregulate the labour market. It needed to become more competitive in order to attract investors.

Portugal bent over backwards to bring in fresh capital. In 2009 it introduced ‘non-habitual residency’ status, designed to lure white-collar workers and foreign pensioners with a ten-year tax exemption. The scheme was an instant hit. Three years later, the government launched a ‘golden visa’ (or ‘residence permit for investment activity’), giving special access to citizenship for foreigners willing to write large cheques. A flood of capital poured into the property sector. Ultimately, successive governments bet everything on the tourism windfall, opening low-cost air routes and liberalising the short-term rental market. Holidaymakers flocked in their millions, bringing foreign currency.

The remedy appeared to work. Portugal returned to growth in 2014, its current account moved into surplus and its public deficit shrank year by year. The former dunce had become the star pupil. But behind the flattering economic indicators, a different reality could be discerned. Since the financial crisis, Portugal has experienced a significant exodus of its population, peaking at 120,000 departures in 2013, and still running at 75,000 in 2023. Most of those who have left are young graduates. With no prospects in an economy dominated by low-skilled service jobs, they can no longer afford to live in the major cities, where rents have doubled in less than ten years. Today, nearly a third of Portuguese aged 15-39 live abroad.

This volume of departures has accelerated the ageing of the population: the country now has just one young person for every two elderly ones, and its fertility rate is among Europe’s lowest. And because people in their seventies weren’t going to start washing dishes in restaurants, cleaning hotel rooms or picking raspberries, in the early 2020s Portugal began bringing in Brazilians, Angolans, Indians, Sri Lankans, Moroccans…

Look at the figures a different way and some studies seem to show a correlation even stronger than the first: between emigration(both internal and international) and the rise of the far right (2). This is partly because the exodus has removed young, educated voters who are less inclined to support xenophobic parties from some areas – and partly because their departure changes the political behaviour of those left behind, in regions sinking deeper into crisis.

So if Portugal held a referendum on migration, what would the right question be? Should it ask whether to expel the underpaid, exploited foreign workers now vital to the economy of a country in demographic decline? Or whether to end the policies that have made young people leave by turning their country into a holiday resort for wealthy pensioners and digital nomads?

Notes.

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